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FORMER JEOPARDY.
Of the many safeguards provided for the protection of the
accused in a criminal trial, few are more valuable, or have a
wider field for their application than that declared in the words,
"No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy
of his life or limb." 1 Nearly all of the state constitutions con-
tain similar provisions. The provision in the United States
Constitution 2 binds only the federal power.3 However, the safe-
guard against being placed twice in jeopardy existed before the
adoption of the constitutions. Blackstone says it is a universal
maxim of the common law that "no man is to be brought into
jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offense.''
4 It
seems, therefore, that the constitutional provisions are merely
declaratory of the common law.5 But under the constitutions,
the maxim has been given a wider application than was given
under the common law, or than is given under a strict construc-
tion of the constitutional provision, a person being in jeopardy
of his life or limb only in capital offenses. The constitutional
provisions, however, have been construed liberally, and they
apply to all criminal offenses, both felonies and misdemeanors.,
In misdemeanors, if no imprisonment is imposed, but only a
penalty, the action is considered as a civil suit and the prohibi-
tion does not apply.7
A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial
before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon indictment or in-
formation, which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain
a conviction, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn.8 The
rule as thus stated has been approved and followed in numerous
cases.9 It does not matter how the first action was terminated
1Ky. Constitution, Section 13.
Amendment V.
Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410.
4 IV. BI. 335.
$State v. Duvall, 65 South. 904.
6 Commonwelath v. Prall, 146 Ky. 109, 142 S. W. 202.
"James v. HeZm, 129 Ky. 323, 111 S. W. 335.
"Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 467.
9 Wi Ziams v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 93 (Conviction possible under
first indictment, dismissal bars second prosecution); Bennett v. Com-
rionwealth, 150 Ky. 604, 150 S. W. 806 (Indictment dismissed because
insufficient, no bar). S1cott v. Comnbmonwealth, 204 Ky. 625, 265 S. W.
20 (Court's dismissal of warrant without trial is no bar to second pros-
ecution). Blyew v. Commonwealth, 12 K. L. R. 742, 15 S. W. 356 (First
court had no jurisdiction, action does not bar second prosecution).
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if jeopardy has attached, it is a bar to another prosecution. It
may be by a discharge of the jury without the consent of the
defendant, and without necessity;1° a quashing of the indict-
ment;" a dismissal of the action through mistake, as, for in-
stance, to the court's jurisdiction. 12 But it has been held that
since by statute the Commonwealth's attorney only may dismiss
a prosecution based upon a good indictment, a judge's dismissal
is reversible error, and not a bar to a subsequent trial. How-
ever, if the judge gives a peremptory instruction to acquit, it is
a bar.13
The Kentucky Code makes some changes in regard to what
terniination of an action will or will not bar another prosecution.
"If the demurrer be sustained because the indictment contains
matter which is a legal defense or bar to the indictment, the
judgment shall be final, and the defendant shall be discharged
from any further prosecution for the offense.'14 "An acquittal
by a judgment upon a verdict, or a conviction, shall bar another
prosecution for the same offense, notwithstanding a defect in
form or substance in the indictment on which the acquittal or
conviction took place." 15 The dismissal of the indictment by
the court, on demurrer, except as provided in Sec. 169, or for an
objection to its form or substance taken on the trial, or for vari-
ance between the indictment and the proof, shall not bar another
prosecution for the same offense.''10 This last-mentioned pro-
vision has been construed, in so far as it says that the dismissal
of an indictment for variance between the indictment and the
proof shall not bar another prosecution, not to prevent the first
action from being a bar, where the variance was immaterial, and
conviction was possible. 17 Two other sections'8 have been held
to be unconstitutional in so far as they authorize, after jeopardy
attaches, the dismissal of an indictment so that it may not operate
as a bar to a future prosecution for the same offense. 9
10 O'Brian v. Commonwealth, 9 Bush 333.
1 Wilson and Tucker v. Commonwealth, 212 Ky. 584, 279 S. W. 988.
'2 Commonwealth v. Ball, 126 Ky. 542, 104 S. W. 324.
Commonwealth v. Adkins, 171 Ky. 299, 188 S. W. 401.
" Ky. Crim. Code, Section 169.
Crim. Code, Section 176.
Crim. Code, Section 178.
"Drake v. Commonwealth, 29 K. L. R. 981, 96 S. W. 580; Gaskins
v. Comm onwealth, 97 Ky. 494, 30 S. W. 1017.
'C Crim. Code, Sections 243, 252.
Williams v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 93.
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It was said in O'Brian v. Commonweath,2° that "Every
intprference on the part of the state after the jury has charge
of the prisoner, by which the accused is prevented from having
a verdict declaring his guilt or innocence, unless upon facts
clearly establishing a case of necessity or showing the prisoner's
consent, must operate as an acquittal, and this is the only mode
of preserving and maintaining thp constitutional provision on
the subject. "21 Two exceptions are named: a case Qf necessity;
and the consent of the accused. There is no general rule as to
when such a necessity exists as will prevent the discharge of a
jury from operating as a bar to a second prosecution. The
judges must exercise discretion in the matter and should dis-
charge the jury "whenever, in their opinion, taking all the cir-
cumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for
the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be de-
feated. '"22 In Kentucky, the sickness of a juror; the disagree-
ment of the jury after a reasonable time for deliberation; the
failure to find a verdict before the time fixed by law for adjourn-
ment, have been held sufficient to justify a discharge of the jury,
so as not to constitute a bar to another action.2 3 In other juris-
dictions, the serious illness or insanity of the accused; illness,
insanity, or death of judge or juror engaged in the trial; death
of juror's mother; misconduct of a juror, and upon judicial in-
quiry a finding that a juror is prejudiced, have been held suffi-
cient to justify discharge.
24
The consent of the accused that will waive his right of set-
ting up former jeopardy may be either express or implied. It
was held to be implied in Riley v. Commonwealth,25 where the
the defendant's counsel told the court it could take what action
it thought proper, and the -court thought it proper to discharge
2"9 Bush 333.
21 Accord: People v. 'Warden of City Prison, 202 N. Y. 138, 95 N.
. 729.
2 United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 579.
21HIlbert v. Commonwealth, 21 K. L. R. 537, 51 S. W. 817; Yar-
brough v. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 151; Commonwealth v. Olds, 5 Litt.
137.
21 State v. Riehardson, 47 S. C. 166, 25 S. E. 220; Fails v. State,
60 Fla. 8, 53 South 612; State v. H-ansford, 76 Kan. 678, 92 Pac. 551;
leople v. Sharp, 163 Mich. 79, 127 N. W. 578; Hedger v. State, 144 Wis.
279, 128 N. W. 80.
21190 Ky. 204, 227 S. W. 146.
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the jury. But mere silence will not be construed into consent.26
The appeal of the accused is a waiver of the defense of former
jeopardy.
27
The difficult question often arises as to when the two offenses
are the same. The same act may be an offense against two juris-
dictions, or the offenses may be distinct, so that it is possible to
base two prosecutions upon the same act.
If the same act is an offense against two jurisdictions, a pros-
ecution by one does not bar that of the other. A conviction in
a federal court under the federal laws does not bar a subsequent
prosecution in the state court under the state prohibition laws
upon the same facts. 28 But where there is concurrent jurisdic-
tion if two courts of an offense against one sovereignty, the first
to acquire jurisdiction cannot be ousted, and the first action is a
bar to a second. 29 One who commits an act which is a con-
tempt of court and also a crime may be proceeded against both
by summary process, and by indictment, and neither proceeding
will bar the other, since the act is an offense against the dignity
of the court, and also against the dignity of the Common-
wealth.30  It was held in an early case that a prosecution under
a city ordinance does not bar a prosecution by the state.31 But
this applies only to prosecutions by the state under the common
law and not under a statute ;32 for by section 168 of the present
Constitution, a municipal ordinance cannot impose a penalty
for a violation thereof at less than that imposed by statute for
the same offense, and a conviction or acquittal under either con-
stitutes a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
The rule for determining whether the two offenses arising
out of the same act are the same is: when the facts necessary to
convict on the second prosecution would necessarily have con-
victed on the first, the first is a bar to the second. 33 An acquittal
Robinson v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 386, 11 S. W. 210.
Keitner v. Commonwealth, 205 Ky. 634, 266 S. W. 354.
" Hodges v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 652, 249 S. W. 774.
' Hawes v. Orr, 10 Bush 431; Commonwealth v. Overby, 80 Ky. 208.
11Long v. Commonwealth, 177 Ky. 391, 197 S. W. 843; State v.
Gardener, 72 N. C. 379.
"I Commonwealth v. Parks, 11 K. L. R. 403; Accord; People v. Bing.
ham, 119 N. Y. Supp. 417.
' L. d- N. 1. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 144 Ky. 558, 139 S. W. 785.
= Bishop's New Crim. Law, 8th ed., p. 508; Shirley v. Common.
wealth, 143 Ky. 183, 136 S. W. 227; Scalf v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 830,
243 S. W. 1034; Lewis v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 48, 255 S. W. 818.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
or conviction for a breach of the peace., unless obtained by fraud
or collusion 3 4 is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for assault and
battery.3 5 But a conviction or acquittal of rape is not a bar to a
prosecution for incest.30 An interesting case on the application
of the rule is Cooper v. Commonwealth,3 7 where the accused was
acquitted of a charge of adultery and later indicted for false
swearing in the former action that he had never committed the
offense. The court said that the accused could not again be put
on trial where the truth or falsity of the charge in the former
indictment was the gist of the question under investigation.
This is a doubtful case; it is clear the accused could not again
be tried for adultery, but it is not so clear that the state should
be barred from showing in a subsequent action that the accused
was guilty of false swearing in the prior action. Not to hold
otherwise is to put a premium on false swearing. In a later :ase
a conviction for breach of the peace was held to be no bar to a
prosecution for perjury committed at the former trial where
accused testified he did not do the acts charged. 38 The court
said that a conviction for a breach of the peace and one !or per-
jury are different things, and if there was anything adjudicated
on the former trial it was that the accused did do the acts with
which he was charged, but that the Commonwealth was still
under necessity of proving the same facts on the second trial
because accused was entitled to face his accusers. This case and
the preceding one are different in that there was a conviction
in the latter and an acquittal in the former, but even with this
difference, it is difficult to reconcile them.
A person who has been put in jeopardy for an offense which
includes other offenses has been put in jeopardy as to all included
offenses. 39 And a conviction or an acquittal for a lesser offense
included in a greater will bar a prosecution for the greater.
40
There is a difference of opinion in the application of this rule in
homicide cases. Some jurisdictions hold that if the prisoner is
14Cor.monwealth v. Crowder, 177 Ky. 268, 197 S. W. 643.
' Comrnonwealth v. Hawkins, 11 Bush 603; Sexton v. Common.
wealth, 193 Ky. 495, 236 S. W. 956.
Burdue v. Commonweatth, 144 Ky. 428, 138 S. W. 296.
37 21 K. L. R. 537, 51 S. W. 817.
Wadlington v. Commonwtalth; 22 K. L. R. 1108, 59 S. W. 851.
Commonwtalth v. Browning, 146 Ky. 770, 143 S. W. 407.
40 Commonwealth v. Gill, 28 K. L. R. 879, 90 S. W. 605; Common-
wealth v. Arner. 149 Pa. St. 35, 24 At]. 83.
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put upon trial for murder and convicted of manslaughter and
that verdict is set aside on defendant's application for a new
trial or on his appeal, he cannot be again tried for murder.
41
This is based upon the theory that the accused's request for a
correction of the verdict is only for so much of it as convicts him
of guilt and not for that which acquits him.4 2 The contrary
line holds that if conviction for the lesser crime is reversed upon
the voluntary appeal of the accused, he thereby waives the ac-
quittal upon the higher charge, and, upon the conviction being
set aside, is placed in the same position as if no trial had been
had. 43  In Kentucky, a code provision is to the same effect, pro-
viding that a new trial places accused in the same position as if
no trial has been had.44 If on trial for murder, the prisoner is
convicted of manslaughter, and obtains a new trial, he may be
again tried for murder.
45
Statutes which provides for a severer punishment on con-
viction for a second or third offense do not violate the constitu-
tional provision. It is held that the subsequent punishment is
not imposed for the first offense, but for persistence in crime. 46
It has been held that where by statute, the state with the
permission of the presiding judge, is allowed an appeal, it may
take the appeal after a verdict of acquittal, upon the ground
that it is a matter of procedure and that jeopardy has not at-
tached.4 7 But this case has been criticized as standing out in
bold relief against the general rule. "The law almost universally
prevalent is that a verdict of acquittal in a criminal case is final
and conclusive, and that there can be no new trial of a criminal
prosecution after an acquittal in it"48 In Kentucky a right of
appeal is given to the state in criminal cases. 49 But it is held
that the accused, having been once acquitted, cannot be prose-
4 Barett v. People, 54 Ill. 325.
"Commonwealth v. Dietrick, 221 Pa. 7, 70 Atl. 275.
"Trono v. U. S., 199 U. S. 521; State v. Ash, 68 Wash 194, 122 Pac.
995.
, Crim. Code, Section 270.
"Commonwealth v. Arndld, 83 Ky. 1.
"Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673; Stirtevant v. Commonwealth,
158 Mass. 598, 33 N. E. 648; Mount v. Commonwealth, 2 Duvall 93.
,,State v. Lee, 65 Conn. 265, 30 At. 1110.
"People v. Corning, 2 N. Y. 9; Kepner v. U. S.. 195 U. S. 100.
'Crim. Code, Section 337.
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cuted a second time after an appeal by the Commonwealth. 50
It seems that on such an appeal, any ruling of the lower court
may be reviewed, whether such ruling is final or not, and with-
out reference to whether the judgment is upon a verdict or on a
demurrer, or whether it is a bar to another prosecution r" It
was said in Commonwealth v. Matthews,5 2 that the right was
only fair to the public, and proper for its protection, because
otherwise the guilty might escape by an acquittal resulting from
legal erors.
L. H. STEPnENS.
THE WORK OF THE 1926 LEGISLATURE.
The 1926 session of the Kentucky General Assembly closed
its biennial course of lawmaking and law repealing and ad-
journed sine die with more bills and less wrangling to its credit
than any other general assembly that has convened at Frank-
for within the last twenty years. This means that, to a certain
extent at least, party bickering was given the minimum of time
and legislation was expedited. The course of procedure was, in
general, quite smooth. A close-up review of the conduct and
achievements of the 1926 General Assembly can necessarily deal
positively only with the nature of the measures passed and de-
feated and the conduct of the organization in control. The
scope of the present article will only cover the former.
A total of 373 bills were passed during the 60 working days
of the legislative session, from January 5 to midnight of March
17. This was 75 more than have been passed at any session since
1906. The nearest approach to this total was reached in 1924
when 298 bills were enacted into laws. Most of the new laws
enacted pertain to the procedure of state and county officials in
the conduct of the affairs of their offices and the administration
of the affairs of the state through these officers. The result
sought seems to have been to expressly regulate the activity of
the various state officers in order to facilitate the administration
of their business and to stop financial leaks in all of the depart-
"' Commonwealth v. Murphzy, 33 R. 141, 109 S. W. 353; Common-
weath, v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333.
as Commonwealth v. Cain, 14 Bush 525.
53 89 Ky. 287, 12 S. W. 333.
